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Abstract. Secret handshake allows a group of authorized users to establish a shared secret key and at the same time authenticate each other
anonymously. A straightforward approach to design an unlinkable secret
handshake protocol is to use either long-term certificate or one-time certificate provided by a trusted authority. However, how to detect the misusing of certificates by an insider adversary is a challenging security issue
when using those approaches for unlinkable secret handshake. In this paper, we propose a novel k-time authenticated secret handshake (k-ASH)
protocol where each authorized user is only allowed to use the credential
for k times. We formalize security models, including session key security and anonymity, for k-ASH, and prove the security of the proposed
protocol under some computational problems which are proved hard in
the generic bilinear group model. The proposed protocol also achieved
public traceability property if a user misuses the k-time credential.
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1

Introduction

Secret handshake is a useful cryptographic primitive and has been extensively
studied in the literature. It allows an authorized user to share a secret key with
others without revealing their real identities. The following scenario can clarify
its practicality. A FBI agent wants to contact with another agent, and both
of them do not want to disclose their identity information during interaction.
The only information they need to know is the peer belongs to the same agent
system. There have been two types of unlinkable secret handshake system in the
literature: one is based on the long-term certificate (e.g., [14, 15]), and the other
is based on one-time certificate (e.g., [16]). In the former type, the authorized
user generates the shared secret value using the secret long-term certificate given
by a trusted authority (TA) of the organization. In the latter type, the long-term
secret value will be replaced by a set of one-time certificates and the authorized
user will use one of them for unlinkable secret handshake in each session.

For the long-term certificate, an authorized user is allowed to reuse the given
certificate when establishing a secret value with another authorized user. For
example, the given secret certificate is blended with Diffie-Hellman key exchange,
in order to generate a secret key with forward secrecy (e.g., [14, 15]). Since the
same certificate is used everytime, how to ensure the unlinkability is the major
challenge in the protocol design. On the other hand, the one-time certificate
approach (e.g., [16]) can address the unlinkability easily since each certificate is
supposed to be used only once. Nevertheless, none of the previous approaches
has considered the issue of misusing of certificates. We should note that for the
one-time certificate schemes, the user is supposed to use each certificate once.
However, reusing the given one-time certificates is a security issue that has not
been formally considered in the previous works.
We give an example where misusing of the certificates (or credentials) should
be prevented in secret handshake in some scenarios. Suppose there are n players
subscribed to a real-time gaming system. Each user will obtain a set of k credentials from the game server after paying a subscription fee that is proportional
to k. The players can form ad-hoc groups to play the game and a player can
join a gaming session using one credential at a time. In order to ensure that
only registered players are eligible to communicate with the peers, the players
should generate a common session key to protect the communication. Also, it is
desirable that the players cannot recognize each other except the fact that they
are all legitimate subscribers of the system. Therefore, we may use a multi-party
secret handshake protocol to achieve the security and privacy goals. However,
in this example, a malicious player may try to reuse his credentials to continue
playing the game without topping up extra money after all the credentials are
used up. Therefore, it is important to identify such cheating players who reuse
their one-time credentials. However, we found that the misusing of credentials
has not been formally addressed in the previous secret handshake schemes. In
this paper, we focus on addressing the credential misusing problem under the
one-time certificate setting, and leave the task of designing such a scheme under
the long-term certificate setting as our future work.
1.1

This work

In this paper, we introduce the notion of k-time authenticated secret handshake
(k-ASH), allowing all authorized users in a system to agree on a common secret value anonymously while preventing them from misusing their credentials
issued by a trusted party of the system. Our contributions can be summarized
as follows:
1. We present the formal security definition for k-time ASH protocol. In particular, we extend the eCK model [21] to define session key security and a
variant of Juels-Weis privacy model [17] to define user anonymity.
2. We present a new unlinkable k-time ASH using anonymized Schnorr signature
[22] and tag bases [25] to trace the cheating users who reuse their one-time
credentials.

3. We prove a variant of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (VoCDH)
and an extension of Decisional Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem
(EVoDCBDH) [27] in the generic bilinear group model, and prove the security
of the new k-time ASH protocol under these assumptions.
1.2

Related work

Key Exchange. Bellare and Rogaway [6] introduced the first complexitytheoretic security model for key exchange under the symmetric-key setting. The
model was later extended and enhanced under different contexts [7, 2, 5]. Canetti
and Krawczyk [11] later refined the previous models and proposed a new model,
known as the CK model, which is widely used in the analysis of many well-known
key exchange protocols. Some variants [20, 21] of CK model were also proposed
to allow an adversary to obtain either long-term secret key or ephemeral secret key of the challenge session. Burmester and Desmedt [10] (BD) introduced
several key exchange protocols in the multi-party setting, including star-based,
broadcast-based, tree-based, and cyclic-based protocols. Later, a few generic
transformations [19, 18, 8] were proposed to convert passive-secure group key
exchange protocols into active-secure ones.
Secret Handshakes. Balfanz et al [1] introduced the concept of secret handshake that allows any users in the same group to generate a shared value secretly
using the long-term certificate approach. Afterwards, Castelluccia et al [12] constructed a more efficient scheme than [1] under the standard Computational
Diffie-Hellman Assumption. But both schemes did not provide the unlinkability
property. In [26], Xu and Yung provided an unlinkable scheme but with weaker
anonymity, named k-unlinkability, which means in the worst case, an adversary
can infer that a participant is one out of certain k users. For achieving the full
anonymity, Jarecki et al [16] proposed two group secret handshake protocols using the BD group key agreement protocol (e.g., [10]). In particular, the second
construction in [16] used one-time certificate to achieve full anonymity under
the Gap Diffie-Hellman Assumption. Meanwhile, several secret handshake protocols have been proposed in the literature (e.g., [14, 15]) which achieved full
anonymity without using one-time certificate. The protocol in [15] and the improvement protocol in [14] are long-time certificate based, and both of them are
allowed to reuse the given certificate with unlimited number of times.

2

Security Model

In this section, we present the security models for k-ASH. As mentioned in the
introduction, a secure k-ASH protocol should achieve both session key security
and anonymity. Below we present the corresponding security models to capture
the above requirements. Specifically, the session key security model is a modified
version of eCK model [21], which is an extension of CK model [11] in the secret

handshake setting, while the anonymity model is extended from the privacy
models ([17, 24]) for RFID authentication protocols.
States. We define a system user set U with n users, i.e. |U| = n. We say an
oracle ΠUi may be used or unused. The oracle is considered as unused if it has
never been initialized. Each unused oracle ΠUi can be initialized with a secret
key x. The oracle is initialized as soon as it becomes part of a group. After
the initialization the oracle is marked as used and turns into the stand-by state
where it waits for an invocation to execute a protocol operation. Upon receiving
such invocation the oracle ΠUi learns its partner identifier pidiU and turns into
a processing state where it sends, receives and processes messages according to
the description of the protocol. During that stage, the internal state information
stateiU is maintained by the oracle. The oracle ΠUi remains in the processing state
until it collects enough information to compute the session key KUi . As soon as
KUi is computed ΠUi accepts and terminates the protocol execution meaning
that it would not send or receive further messages. If the protocol execution fails
then ΠUi terminates without having accepted.
Partnering. We denote the i-th session established by a user U by ΠUi , and
identities of all the users recognized by ΠUi during the execution of that session
by pidiU . We define sidiU as the unique session identifier belonging to the session
i established by the user U . Specifically, sidiU = {mj }nj=1 , where mj ∈ {0, 1}∗ is
the message transcript among users. We say two instance oracles ΠUi and ΠUj 0
are partners if and only if pidiU = pidjU 0 and sidiU = sidjU 0 .
2.1

System Model

We define a k-time authenticated secret handshake protocol consists of the following algorithms:
– Setup: The algorithm takes the security parameter λ as input, outputs the
master public parameters mpk (including the k-time tag bases) and the master
secret keys msk.
– KeyGen: The algorithm takes the master public key mpk as input, outputs a
public/secret key pair (X, x).
– Register: This is an interactive algorithm that executed between the user and
the TA. TA takes the master secret key msk and a public key X of one user
as input, outputs a set of credentials {si }ki=1 on X. The user will become a
registered user after interaction with TA.
– Handshake: This is an interactive algorithm that executed by registered users.
Each user takes his/her secret key x, one of his/her credentials {si }ki=1 and
mpk as input, outputs a shared secret key K if and only if his/her counterparts
are registered users.
– Tracing: The algorithm takes two handshake transcripts of one user and one
of tag bases as input, outputs the user’s public key X.

2.2

Session Key Security

We define the session key security model for k-ASH protocols, in which each user
obtains a set of credentials associated with his/her public key from the TA, and
establishes a session key using one of the given secret credentials in one session.
The model is defined via a game between a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversary A and a simulator S. A is an active attacker with full control of the
communication channel among all the users.
– Setup: S first generates master public/secret key pair (mpk, msk) for the TA
and long-term secret keys {xi }ni=1 for n users by running the corresponding
KeyGen algorithms, where xi denotes the secret key of user i. In addition, S
generates a set of secret credentials {si,j }kj=1 for user i by running the Register
algorithm. S also tosses a random coin b which will be used later in the game.
Let U denote all the registered users.
– Training: A can make the following queries in arbitrary sequence to simulator
S.
• Establish: A is allowed to register a user U 0 with public key Xi0 . If a user is
registered by A, then we call this user dishonest; Otherwise, it is honest.
• Send: If A issues send query in the form of (U, i, m) to simulate a network
message for the i-th session of user U , then S would simulate the reaction
of instance oracle ΠUi upon receiving message m, and returns to A the
response that ΠUi would generate; If A issues send query in the form of
(U,0 start0 ), then S creates a new instance oracle ΠUi and returns to A the
first protocol message.
• Session key reveal: A can issue reveal query to an accepted instance oracle
ΠUi . If the session is accepted, then S will return the session key to A;
Otherwise, a special symbol ‘⊥’ is returned to A.
• Ephemeral secret key reveal: If A issues an ephemeral secret key reveal
query to (possibly unaccepted) instance oracle ΠUi , then S will return all
ephemeral secret values contained in ΠUi at the moment the query is asked.
• long term secret key reveal: If A issues a long term secret key reveal (or
corrupt, for short) query to user i, then S will return both the long term
secret key and the secret credential set (xi , {si,j }kj=1 ) to A.
• Master secret key reveal: If A issues a master secret key reveal query to TA,
then S will return the master secret keys msk to A.
• Test: This query can only be made to an accepted and fresh (as defined
below) session i of a user U . Then S does the following:
∗ If the coin b = 1, S returns the real session key to the adversary;
∗ Otherwise, a random session key is drawn from the session key space and
returned to the adversary.
Note that A can generate a set of secret credentials {si,j }kj=1 of user i after
issuing Master secret key reveal query to TA. It is also worth noting that A
can continue to issue other queries after the Test query. However, the test
session must maintain fresh throughout the entire game.
Finally, A outputs b0 as its guess for b. If b0 = b, then the simulator outputs
1; Otherwise, the simulator outputs 0.

Freshness. We say an accepted instance oracle ΠUi is fresh if A does not perform
any of the following actions during the game:
– A issues Session key reveal query to ΠUi or its accepted partnered instance
oracle ΠUj 0 ;
– A issues both Long term secret key reveal query to U 0 s.t. U 0 ∈ pidiU and
Ephemeral secret key reveal query for an instance ΠUj 0 partnered with ΠUi ;
– A issues Long term secret key reveal query to user U 0 s.t. U 0 ∈ pidiU prior to the
acceptance of instance ΠUi and there exists no instance oracle ΠUj 0 partnered
with ΠUi .
Note that the Master key reveal query to TA is equivalent to the Long term
secret key reveal to all users in pidiU .
We define the advantage of an adversary A in the above game as
AdvA (λ) = Pr[S → 1] − 1/2.

(1)

Definition 1. We say a k-ASH protocol has session key security if for any PPT
A, AdvA (λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
2.3

Anonymity

Informally, an adversary is not allowed to identify who are the handshake users,
with the condition that honest users authenticate with each other within k times.
We define a game between an insider adversary A and a simulator S as follows:
– Setup: S generates master public/secret key pairs (mpk, msk) for the TA and
long term secret keys {xi }ni=1 for n users by running the corresponding KeyGen
algorithms. In addition, S generates a set of secret credentials {si,j }kj=1 for
user i by running the Register algorithm. S also tosses a random coin b which
will be used later in the game. We denote the original n users set as U.
– Training: A is allowed to issue Establish, Send, Ephemeral secret key reveal,
Session key reveal and at most n-2 Long term secret key reveal queries to S. We
denote the honest (i.e., uncorrupted) user set as U 0 .
– Challenge: A randomly selects two users Ui , Uj ∈ U 0 as challenge candidates,
then S remove them from U 0 and simulates Ub∗ to A by either Ub∗ = Ui if b = 1
or Ub∗ = Uj if b = 0.
Let A interact with Ub∗ . Note that A is allowed to activate at most k sessions
for Ui , Uj throughout the entire game.

Ui
b=1
∗
A ⇔ Ub =
Uj
b=0
0
0
Finally, A outputs b as its guess for b. If b = b, then the simulator outputs
1; Otherwise, the simulator outputs 0.
We define the advantage of A in the above game as
AdvA (λ) = Pr[S → 1] − 1/2.

(2)

Definition 2. We say a k-ASH protocol has anonymity if for any PPT A,
AdvA (λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.

3
3.1

Our Construction
Preliminaries

Bilinear Map. The bilinear map ê : G × G → G1 has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ê(g αi , g αj ) = ê(g, g)αi ·αj : ∀αi , αj ∈ Zq , g ∈ G.
2. Non-degeneracy: ê(g, g) 6= 1.
3. Computable: There exists an efficient algorithm for computing the bilinear
map.
Note that the map ê is symmetric since ê(g αi , g αj ) = ê(g, g)αi ·αj = ê(g αj , g αi ).
3.2

Modified Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem

Definition 3. Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption [20]:
Given g, g a , g b ∈ G where a, b ∈R Zq , we define the advantage of the adversary
in solving the CDH problem as
AdvCDH
(λ) = Pr[A(g, g a , g b ) = g ab ∈ G]
A
We say a CDH assumption holds in group G if for any PPT A, AdvA (λ) is a
negligible function of the security parameter λ.
We propose a variant of computational diffie-hellman problem (VoCDH) below.
Definition 4. Given g, g a , g 1/a , g b ∈ G where a, b ∈R Zq , we define the advantage of the adversary in solving the VoCDH problem as
AdvVAoCDH (λ) = Pr[A(g, g a , g 1/a , g b ) = g ab ∈ G]
We prove the above VoCDH problem is hard in G with a bilinear map ê : G×G →
G1 in the generic bilinear group model [23, 9].
Theorem 1. Let 1 , 2 : Fp → {0, 1}∗ be two random encodings (injective functions) where Fp is a prime field and G = {1 (a)|a ∈ Fp }, G1 = {2 (a)|a ∈ Fp }.
If a, b are uniformly and independently chosen from Fp and encodings 1 , 2 are
randomly chosen, we then define the advantage of the adversary in solving the
VoCDH with at most q, q1 queries to the group operation oracles O, O1 and qê
queries to the bilinear pairing oracle Oê : 1 × 1 → 2 as
AdvVAoCDH (λ) = Pr[A(1 (1), 1 (a), 1 (b), 1 (a−1 ))
4(q + q1 + qeb + 4)2
= 1 (a · b)] ≤
p

Proof. Let S be the simulator to simulate the entire game for A. S maintains
two polynomial sized dynamic lists: L1 = {(pi , 1,i )}, L2 = {(qi , 2,i )}, the pi ∈
Fp [X1 , X2 ] are 2-variate polynomials over Fp , such that p0 = 1, p1 = X1 , p2 =
X2 , p3 = X1p−2 , and {1,i }3i=0 ∈R {0, 1}∗ are corresponding arbitrary strings, S
then sets those pairs (pi , 1,i ) as L1 . Therefore, the two lists are initialised as
L1 = {(pi , 1,i )}3i=0 , L2 = ∅.
At the beginning of the game, S sends {1,i }i=0,··· ,3 to A. After this, S
simulates the group operation oracle O, O1 and the bilinear pairing oracle Oê as
follows. We assume that all requested operands are obtained from S.
– O: The group operation involves two operands 1,i , 1,j . Based on these
operands, S searches the list L1 for the corresponding polynomials pi and
pj . Then S perform the polynomial addition or subtraction pl = pi ± pj depending on whether multiplication or division is requested. If pl is in the list
L1 , then S returns the corresponding l to A. Otherwise, S uniformly chooses
1,l ∈R {0, 1}∗ , where 1,l is unique in the encoding string L1 , and appends
the pair (pl , 1,l ) into the list L1 . Finally, S returns 1,l to A as the answer.
Group operation queries in G1 (i.e., O1 ) is treated similarly.
– Oê : The group operation involves two operands 1,i , 1,j . Based on these
operands, S searches the list L1 for the corresponding polynomials pi and
pj . Then S perform the polynomial multiplication pl = pi · pj . If pl is in the
list L2 , then S returns the corresponding 2,l to A. Otherwise, S uniformly
chooses 2,l ∈R {0, 1}∗ , where 2,l is unique in the encoding string L2 , and
appends the pair (pl , 2,l ) into the list L2 . Finally, S returns 2,l to A as the
answer.
After querying at most q, q1 , qe times of corresponding oracles, A terminates
and outputs 1 (x1 · x2 ). At this point, S chooses random a, b ∈R Fp and sets
X1 = a, X2 = b. The simulation by S is perfect unless the abort event happens.
Thus, we bound the probability of event abort by analyzing the following cases:
1. pi (a, b) = pj (a, b): Since pi 6= pj as the method of L1 is generated, pi − pj
is a non-zero polynomial of degree 0, 1, or p − 2 where p − 2 is produced by
X1p−2 . Since X1 ·X1p−2 = X1p−1 ≡ 1 (mod p), we have X1 (pi −pj ) is a non-zero
polynomial of degree 0, 1, or 2. Therefore, the maximum degree of X1 (pi −pj )
is 2. By using lemma 1 in [23], we have Pr[(X1 (pi − pj ))(a, b) = 0] ≤ p2 and

thus Pr[pi (a, b) = pj (a, b)] ≤ p2 . As there are q+4
pairs of (pi , pj ), we have
2

2
the abort probability is Pr[abort1 ] ≤ q+4
·
.
2
p
2. qi (a, b) = qj (a, b): Since
q
=
6
q
as
the
method
of L2 is generated and qi , qj
i
j
P
are in the form of
ak,l pk pj for some constants ak,l , qi − qj is a non-zero
polynomial of degree 0, 1, 2, p−1, p−2, or 2p−4. Similar to above case, we have
X12 · X1p−1 ≡ X12 , X12 · X1p−2 ≡ X1 , and X12 · X12p−4 = (X1p−1 )2 ≡ 1 (mod p).
Therefore, X12 (qi − qj ) is a non-zero polynomial of degree ranging from 0 to 4.
Since the maximum degree of X12 (qi −qj ) is 4, we have Pr[(X12 (qi −qj))(a, b) =
e
b
0] ≤ p4 and thus Pr[qi (a, b) = qj (a, b)] ≤ p4 . As there are q1 +q
pairs of
 42
q1 +qeb
(qi , qj ), we have the abort probability is Pr[abort2 ] ≤
·
.
2
p

3. pi (a, b) = ab: Since the degree of p1 is 0, 1, or p − 2, and the degree of X1 X2
is 2, we have that pi − X1 X2 is a non-zero polynomial of degree 2 or p − 2.
Similar to the case 1, we have X1 (pi − X1 X2 ) is a non-zero polynomial of
maximum degree of 3. Therefore, we have Pr[(X1 (pi − X1 X2 ))(a, b) = 0] ≤ p3
and thus Pr[pi (a, b) = ab] ≤ p3 . As there are q + 4 polynomials in L1 , we have
the abort probability is Pr[abort3 ] ≤

3(q+4)
.
p

By combining all above cases, we have the abort probability is
Pr[abort] = Pr[abort1 ] + Pr[abort2 ] + Pr[abort3 ]




q+4
2
q1 + qeb
4 3(q + 4)
≤
· +
· +
2
p
p
p
2
(q + 4)2 + 2(q1 + qeb)2 + 3(q + 4)
<
p
4(q + q1 + qeb + 4)2
<
p
3.3

Modified Decisional Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem

Definition 5. Variant of Decisional Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Problem: Given g, g a , g b , hc , hd , h1/d ∈ G where a, b, c, d ∈R Zq and h = g e , we
define the advantage of the adversary in solving the VoDCBDH problem as
AdvVoDCBDH
(λ) = Pr[w = A(g, g a , g b , g ec , g ed , g e/d ,
A
T0 , T1 , w ∈R {0, 1}) : Tw = g ab+ecd , Tw−1 = Z].
The VoDCBDH problem is a variant of Decisional Combined Bilinear DiffieHellman Problem [27]. We prove the VoDCBDH problem is hard in G with a
bilinear map ê : G × G → G1 in the generic bilinear group model [23, 9].
Theorem 2. The lower bound of the complexity of the VoDCBDH problem is
stated as follows, querying the group operations and bilinear pairing operations
at most q times.
3(q + 9)2
AdvVoDCBDH
(λ)
≤
.
A
p
To prove this theorem, we introduce an intermediate problem (see Lemma 2),
and we prove that the hardness of intermediate problem implies the hardness
of the VoDCBDH problem. After that, we prove the intermediate problem is
intractable (see Lemma 1) and then the theorem follows.
2

Definition 6. Given g, g d , g cd , g d , g e , g ae , g be ∈ G where a, b, c, d, e ∈R Zp and
2
g ∈R G, the modified problem is to distinguish g abe+cd from a random element
Z ∈R G. The advantage of an adversary A to solve the modified problem is
defined as
2

AdvModified
(λ) = Pr[w = A(g, g d , g cd , g d , g e , g ae , g be ,
A
2

T0 , T1 , w ∈R {0, 1}) : Tw = g abe+cd , Tw−1 = Z]

Lemma 1. If an algorithm A can solve the VoDCBDH problem with the advantage AdvVoDCBDH
(λ), then we can built an algorithm S to solve the modified
A
problem with the advantage AdvModified
(λ) such that
S
AdvVoDCBDH
(λ) ≤ AdvModified
(λ).
A
S
ˆ

ˆ

ˆ2

Proof. The simulator S obtains an instance θ̂ = (ĝ, ĝ d , ĝ ĉd , ĝ d , ĝ ê , ĝ âê , ĝ b̂ê , T0 , T1 ).
ˆ
ˆ
Then S checks whether ĝ d = 1 or not. If ĝ d = 1, that is dˆ = 0, the simulator
S returns w = 0 if e(ĝ âê , ĝ b̂ê ) = e(T0 , ĝ ê ) or returns w = 1 otherwise, and
ˆ
solves θ̂ with the probability of 1. If ĝ d 6= 1, the simulator S continues and sets
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆ2
a b
c
d
θ = (g, g , g , h, h , h , h d , T0 , T1 ) = (ĝ ê , ĝ âê , ĝ b̂ê , ĝ d , ĝ ĉd , ĝ d , ĝ, T0 , T1 ), it implicˆ
ˆ After that, S sends θ
itly sets g = ĝ ê , h = ĝ d , a = â, b = b̂, c = ĉ, and d = d.
to A. At some point, the adversary A outputs a bit w, indicating Tw = g ab hcd .
ˆ ˆ
ˆ2
Since Tw = g ab hcd = (ĝ ê )âb̂ (ĝ d )ĉd = ĝ âb̂ê+ĉd , the simulator S wins with the
probability AdvVoDCBDH
(λ). Therefore, we have
A
ˆ

ˆ

(λ)
AdvModified
(λ) ≥ Pr[ĝ d = 1] + Pr[ĝ d 6= 1] · AdvVoDCBDH
A
S
1 p−1
≥ +
AdvVoDCBDH
(λ) ≥ AdvVoDCBDH
(λ).
A
A
p
p
Lemma 2. The lower bound of the complexity of the modified problem is stated
as follows, querying the group operations and bilinear pairing operations at most
q times.
3(q + 9)2
AdvModified
(λ)
≤
.
S
p
Proof. The modified problem is an instance of Decisional Bilinear (P, f )-DiffieHellman problem family [27] where P = (p1 , . . . , p7 ) = (1, d, cd, d2 , e, ae, be) and
f = abe + cd2 . We show that f is not dependent on P by contradiction.
Assume f is dependent on P that by definition in [27] there exists 57 constants ai,j , bk , and c that
Q = cf 2 +

7
X
k=1

bk pk f +

7 X
7
X

ai,j pi pj = 0

i=1 j=1

where at least one of bk or c is non-zero. We analyze the above equation in two
cases.
1. c 6= 0: In this case, there is a term f 2 = a2 b2 e2 + 2abcd2 e + c2 d4 in Q.
Furthermore, the term a2 b2 e2 is not in any combination of pk f or pi pj , then
f 2 cannot be canceled out. Hence, we havePQ 6= 0 if c 6= 0.
P7 P7
7
2. c = 0: In this case, we have Q = cf 2 + k=1 bk pk f + i=1 j=1 ai,j pi pj
where at least one of bk is non-zero. In other words, Q has at least a term
pk f = pk (abe + cd2 ) = pk abe + pk cd2 . As Q = 0, both two terms pk abe and
pk cd2 should be canceled out. In the first step, we focus on the term pk abe.
There are two methods to cancel the term pk abe.

(a) To cancel with pk0 f = pk abe + pk0 cd2 where k 6= k 0 , we have pk abe =
pk0 cd2 , that is, pk = θcd2 and pk0 = θabe for some polynomial θ. Since
no such pair of pk and pk0 in P , we cannot cancel pk abe via pk0 f .
(b) To cancel with pi pj , we have pk abe = pi pj . By observing P , the only
polynomial which has a is p6 = ae. Thus we have pk abe = p6 pj ⇐⇒
pk b = pj . By observing P again, the only polynomial which has b is
p7 = be. Thus we have pk = e = p5 .
Therefore, pk abe can be canceled out when k = 5. To further cancel out
p5 f , the term p5 cd2 = cd2 e has to be canceled out. As before, there are two
methods to cancel the term cd2 e.
(a) To cancel with pk f = pk abe + pk cd2 where k 6= 5, we have pk abe = cd2 e.
2
2
Since the term cd
ab is not in P , we cannot cancel out the term cd e.
2
(b) To cancel with pi pj , we have pi pj = cd e. By observing P , the only
polynomial, which has c is p3 = cd. Thus we have pi p3 = cd2 e ⇐⇒
pi = de. Since the term de is not in P , we cannot cancel out the term
cd2 e.
Since it is impossible to cancel out any term pk f , we have Q 6= 0 if c = 0.
To sum up, it is impossible to make Q = 0, which contradicts the assumption.
Therefore, we have f is not dependent on P . By the theorem 1 in [27], we directly
have the lemma.
By combining the Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we have
AdvVoDCBDH
(λ) ≤ AdvModified
(λ) ≤
A
S
3.4

3(q + 9)2
.
p

Extended Decisional Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Problem

We propose an extension of variant of Decisional Combined Bilinear DiffieHellman Problem below.
Definition 7. Extended variant of Decisional Combined Bilinear DiffieHellman (EVoDCBDH) Assumption: Given g, g a , g b , g e , g f , hc , hd , h1/d , hl ∈
G where a, b, c, d, e, f, l ∈R Zq and h = g e , we define the advantage of the adversary in solving the EVoDCBDH problem as
AdvEVoDCBDH
(λ) = Pr[w = A(g, g a , g b , g f , hc , hd , h1/d ,
A
hl , T0 , T1 , w ∈R {0, 1}) : Tw = g ab+ecd , Tw−1 = g bf +edl ]
Theorem 3. We say a EVoDCBDH assumption holds in group G if for any
PPT A, AdvA (λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
Proof. Let S denote the VoDCBDH problem solver, who is given (g a , g b , g e ,
g f , hc , hd , h1/d , hl ), and aims to distinguish T = g ab · hcd from another value
g bf · hdl . S simulates the game for A as follows.

– Setup: S chooses f, l ∈R Zq and computes g f , hl , then generates other public
parameters using the given instances and sends them to A. S also tosses a
random coin w which will be used later in the game.
– Challenge stage: S returns the challenge T if b = 0; Otherwise, returns the
value g bf · hdl to A. Note that the value T comes from his own challenger.
Finally, A outputs w0 as its guess for w. If w0 = w, then S outputs 1; Otherwise, S outputs 0.
Probability analysis: Since the value T from its challenger can be either g ab ·hcd
or R, thus we have
AdvVS oDCBDH = Pr[A → 1 | T = g ab · hcd ] − Pr[A → 1 | T = R]
oDCBDH
= [AdvEV
+ 1/2] − [AdvVS oDCBDH + 1/2]
A
oDCBDH
= AdvEV
− AdvVS oDCBDH
A
oDCBDH
⇒ AdvEV
= 2 · AdvVS oDCBDH .
A

3.5

Exponent Challenge Response Signature

We firstly review the Exponent Challenge-Response signature, which will be used
in our k-ASH protocol.
Definition 8. The Exponential Challenge-Response (XCR) signature
scheme [20]. The signer possess a public/secret key pair (g a , a) (a ∈ Zq ). A
0
verifier provides a message m together with a challenge g w (w0 ∈ Zq is chosen
0
by verifier). The signature produced by signer using challenge g w is defined as
0
w
(g w , g w (w+a·H(g ||m)) ) (w ∈ Zq is chosen by signer). Then the verifier accepts a
w
0
signature pair (g w , σ) as valid iff g w 6= 0 and σ = (g w · g a·H(g ||m) )w .
3.6

Our k-ASH protocol

Now we present our proposed unlinkable secret handshake with k-time authentication protocol in the two party setting (without loss of generality, we use user
b and user B
b here). It works as follows:
A
– Setup: TA takes the security parameter λ and the number of handshakes k as
i=k
input, outputs the master public key mpk = (g, h, {g ti }i=1
, hα , h1/α ), and the
i=k
master secret key msk = ({ti }i=1 , α). TA also generates four hash functions
H1 : G × G1 → Zq , H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq , H3 : G → Zq , H4 : G → Zq and denotes
the bilinear pairing ê : G × G → G1 .
b chooses xa ∈ Zq and computes g xa as his/her public key.
– KeyGen: User A
b submits his/her public key g xa to TA. TA then chooses wa ∈
– Register: User A
i
Zq and computes sai = wai +α ·H1 (hwai ||ê(g xa , hα )ti ) and returns a credential
i=k
b
b
set {hwai }i=k
i=1 , {sai }i=1 to user A. While user A can verify them using the
?

following equations: {hsai =hwai · hα·H1 (h
– Handshake:

wa
i

||ê(hα ,g ti )xa ) i=k
}i=1 .

b
A

b
B
R
−−−−−−−−−−−a−−−−−−−−−→
ti
wb
d
Rb , g , h i , Cbi , C
b , eb
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−−−i−−−−−
d
g ti , hwai , Cai , C
a , ea
−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−−−i−−−−→
Fig. 1. Handshake

b chooses the ephemeral secret key ra ∈R Zq , computes Ra = hra0 =
• User A
b
hH2 (ra ||xa ||sai ) and sends it to user B;
b performs the following.
• User B
0

∗ Choose the ephemeral secret key rb ∈R Zq , computes Rb = hrb =
hH2 (rb ||xb ||sbi ) ;
∗ Compute Cbi = ê(hα , g ti )xb ;
r0
ti ·xb
∗ Compute Cc
· hsbi ·eb /α , where eb = H3 (Rab );
bi = g
b
∗ Send Rb , g ti , hwbi , Cbi , Cc
bi , eb to user A.
b receives the incoming message from user B,
b then performs the fol• User A
lowing.
r0

?

∗ Verify ea = H3 (Rba )=eb . If verification fails, reject the session; Otherwise,
proceeds;
wb
α·ebi
α ?
∗ Verify ê(Cc
, hea ), where ebi = H1 (hwbi ||Cbi ). If
bi , h )=Cbi · ê(h i · h
verification fails, reject the session; Otherwise, proceed to the next step;
∗
∗
∗ Compute the session key K = H4 ((hsbi ·eb · Rb )sa ), where e∗b = H3 (Rb ||ebi ),
s∗a = sai · e∗a + ra0 , e∗a = H3 (Ra ||eai ), eai = H1 (hwai ||Cai );
ba , ea to user B.
b Note that the computation of Ca , C
ba
∗ Send g ti , hwai , Cai , C
i
i
i
b follows the same procedures as above.
by user A
b verifies the received message using the same method as user A,
b and
• User B
∗
∗
computes the session key K = H4 ((hsai ·ea · Ra )sb ), where e∗a = H3 (Ra ||eai ),
s∗b = sbi · e∗b + rb0 , e∗b = H3 (Rb ||ebi ).
Note that the computation of session key used the XCR signature from [20].
– Tracing
0
0
b used the same credential twice, e.g., (C
d
d
If user A
ai , eai ) and (Cai , eai ), then
0
anyone
can
compute
g ti ·xa
=
[(g ti ·xa · hsai ·eai /α )eai /
0
0
(g ti ·xa · hsai ·eai /α )eai ]1/(eai −eai ) , where eai = H3 (Rra ), e0ai = H3 (R0ra ). That
b reused a credential, then user A’
b identity can be revealed
means if user A
ti ·xa
ti
xa
xa
since ê(g
, g) = ê(g , g ) for public key g .

4

Security Analysis

4.1

Session Key Security

Theorem 4. The proposed k-ASH protocol achieves session key security (Definition 1) in the random oracle model if the VoCDH assumption is held in the
underlying group G.
Proof. We define a sequence of games Gi , i = 0, · · · , 3 and let Advk−ASH
denote
i
the advantage of the adversary in game Gi . Assume that A activates at most m
(perhaps m ≥ k) sessions in each game.
– G0 This is original game for session key security.
– G1 This game is identical to game G0 except that S will output a random bit
if the nonce Ri is used twice by two different instance oracles. Therefore, we
have:
Advk−ASH
− Advk−ASH
≤ m2 /2λ
(3)
0
1
– G2 This game is identical to game G1 except that S will output a random bit if Forge event happens where A made a send query in the form
∗r0
of (hr0 , g ti , hw0 , ê(hα , g ti )xi , g ti ·xi · hs0 ·H3 (R )/α , H3 (R∗·r0 )) and an H4 query
∗
r0
w0
α ti x i
with a valid forgery σ = R∗s0 = R∗[s0 ·H3 (h ||H1 (h ||ê(h ,g ) ))+r0 ] for challenge R∗ , such that user i is not corrupted (i.e., no Long term secret key reveal
query to user i or Master secret key reveal query to TA) when the hash query
is made. Then we have:
Advk−ASH
− Advk−ASH
≤ Pr[Forge]
1
2

(4)

Lemma 3. The Forge event happens only with a negligible probability when
the VoCDH assumption is held in G.
Let S denote the VoCDH problem solver, who is given ha , h1/a , hb , and aims
to compute hab . S simulates the game for A as follows:
• Setup stage: F sets up the game for A by creating n users (set U) with
the corresponding public/secret key pairs {Xi , xi }ni=1 . F randomly selects
an index i and guesses that the Forge event will happen with regard to
user i and session i. S then sets the mpk as hα = ha , h1/α = h1/a and
generates other public parameters honestly. In addition, S sets the challenge
as R∗ = hb in the guessed session i, S simulates the game for A as follows.
• S answers A’s queries as follows:
∗ If A issues establish query in the form of (U 0 , X 0 ), such that U 0 ∈
/ U, then
user U 0 with public key X 0 will be added to the system.
0
0
0
0
∗ If A issues a send query in the form of (hr , g ti , hw , ê(ha , g ti )x , g ti ·x ·
0 0
h(s ·e )/a ) to user i, then S verifies it successfully (notice that A may
0
corrupt a user with secret key x0 and secret signature pair (hw , s0 )), and
next to generating the signatures (hwi , si ) as follows:
1. Chooses si , ei ∈R Zq ;

2. Sets hwi = hsi /ha·ei ;
3. Sets H1 (hwi ||Ci ) = ei , where Ci = ê(ha , g ti )xi .
0 0
Then, S chooses ri0 ∈ Zq and computes e = H3 (hr ·ri ). Eventually, S
0
generates the message (hri , g ti , hwi , Ci , g ti ·xi · h(si ·e)/a , e) and sends it to
A.
∗ If A issues an ephemeral secret key reveal query to instance oracle ΠUi i ,
then S returns the ephemeral value ri (ri0 = H2 (ri ||xi ||si )) to A.
∗ If A issues a long term secret key reveal query to user j (6= i), then S
returns xj and secret signatures {sj }kj=1 to A. Note that S can simulate
secret signatures (hwj , sj ) of user j (6= i) using the same method that
described above. If A issues a long term secret key reveal key query to
user i or a master secret key reveal key query to TA, then abort.
∗ Session key reveal query and Test query: S answers the session key reveal
query and the test query by using the session key it has derived during
the protocol simulation described above.
• When Forge event occurs (i.e., A outputs: hr0 , g ti , hw0 , ê(ha , g ti )xi ,
b·r0
g ti ·xi · h(s0 ·H3 (h ))/a , H3 (hb·r0 )), S checks whether:
1. The Forge event with respect to user i on challenge hb ;
2. Verifies:
ê(g ti ·xi · h(s0 ·H3 (h

b·r0

))/a

∗

?

, ha ) = ê(ha , g ti )xi · ê(hs0 , he )

Note that hs0 = hw0 · ha·e1 , s0 = w0 + a · e1 , e1 = H1 (hw0 ||ê(ha , g ti )xi ),
e∗ = H3 (hb·r0 ).
3. Verifies:
b

ê(D, h) = ê((hsi ·H3 (h
?

||ei )

si ·H3 (hb ||ei )

= ê(h

r0

· hb )s0 ·H3 (h
b

s0 ·e0

· h ,h

||e1 )+r0

, h)

r0

·h )

Note that the value D is used to compute session key K(= H4 (D)),
e0 = H3 (hr0 ||e1 ).
If all the above conditions hold, S confirms it as a successful forgery from
H4 and proceeds:
σ1 =

D
(hs0 ·e0 · hr0 )si ·H3 (hb ||ei )

= (hb )s0 ·e0 +r0 = hb[(w0 +a·e1 )e0 +r0 ]
According to the forking lemma [4], by rewinding the adversary twice, S
would obtain four forgeries from H4 , which will be listed below.
σ1 = hb[(w0 +a·e1 )e0 +r0 ] , e0 = H3 (hr0 ||e1 );
0

σ2 = hb[(w0 +a·e1 )e0 +r0 ] , e00 = H3 (hr0 ||e1 );
0

0

0

σ3 = hb[(w0 +a·e1 )eb0 +r0 ] , eb0 = H3 (hr0 ||e01 );
0 b0
0
0
σ4 = hb[(w0 +a·e1 )e0 +r0 ] , eb00 = H3 (hr0 ||e01 );

Therefore, S can perform the computation below to obtain a solution to
VoCDH.
σ1 1/(e0 −e00 )
)
= hb·w0 · hab·e1
σ2
0
σ3
b0
D2 = ( )1/(eb0 −e0 ) = hb·w0 · hab·e1
σ4
D1 1/(e1 −e01 )
hab = (
)
.
D2
D1 = (

The simulation performed by S is perfect. Since at most n users and m sessions
in the game, we have:
Pr[Forge] ≤ n · m · AdvVS oCDH (λ)

(5)

– G3 : This game is identical to game
G2 except that in the test session, we
∗ ∗
replace the session key K = H4 (hsi ·sj ) by a random value r ∈ Zq . Since we
model H4 as a random oracle, if the event Forge does not happen, then we
have
Advk−ASH
= Advk−ASH
(6)
2
3
It is easy to see that in game G3 , A has no advantage, i.e.,
Advk−ASH
=0
3

(7)

Combining the above results together, we have
Advk−ASH
(λ) ≤
A
4.2

m2 /2λ + n · m · AdvVAoCDH (λ)

Anonymity

Theorem 5. The proposed k-ASH protocol achieves anonymity (Definition 2) in
the random oracle model if the EVoDCBDH Assumption is held in the underlying
group G.
Proof. Let S denote a EVoDCBDH problem distinguisher, who is given (g, h, g a ,
g b , g f , hc , hd , H1/d , hl ), and aims to distinguish g ab · hcd and g bf · hdl . S simulates
the game for A as follows.
– Setup: S sets up the game for A by creating n users. S sets hα = h1/d , h1/α =
hd (the msk = (α, 1/α) are implicitly set as (1/d, d) respectively), and ran∗
domly selects one tag base g t = g b and generates other tag bases honestly
ti
(i.e., g , ti ∈ Zq is chosen by S). In addition, S randomly chooses users i, j
from user set U and sets g xi = g a , g xj = g f (the secret keys (xi , xj ) are implicitly set as (a, f ) respectively), and generates public/secret key pair for other
users honestly.
0
cb0 ) to user i, then S
– If A issues a send query in the form of (R0 , g ti , hw , Cb0 , C
performs the simulation as follows.

• S simulates the signature pair (hwi , si ) using the same method that described in Lemma 3;
ci = g a·ti · hd·si ·e0i , and Ci = ê(h1/d , g a )ti , where e0 = H3 (R0ri ),
• S computes C
i
ri ∈ Zq ;
• S generates Ri = hri and sets ei = H1 (hwi ||Ci );
ci , e0 ) to user A as the response.
• S returns (Ri , g ti , hwi , Ci , C
i
Note that S can simulate the response of user j using the same method as
above.
– It is easy to see that all queries to other users can be simulated perfectly
using the user secret keys, and S can simulate secret credentials using the
same method as described in Lemma 3.
0
c0 ) to user i,
– Challenge: If A issues a send query in the form of (R, g ti , hw , Ci0 , C
i
∗
∗
ba
dc
e
1/d
c
e
ci = (g ·h ) and Ci = ê(C
ci , h )/ê(h , h ), where e∗ =
then S computes C
∗
ci , e∗ ) to A as the response.
H3 (Rr ). Eventually, S returns (R∗ , g b , hwi , Ci , C
cj = (g bf ·
Similarly, if A issues a send query to user j, then S computes C
∗
∗
∗
cj , h1/d )/ê(hl , he ), where e∗ = H3 (Rr ). Eventually, S
hdl )e and Cj = ê(C
∗ b
wj
cj , e∗ ) to A as the response. Note that S can perfectly
returns (R , g , h , Cj , C
wi
simulate the value h = hc /hei /d , and sets ei = H1 (hwi ||Ci ) for user i, S also
can simulate the value hwj of user j using the same method.
Finally, S outputs whatever A outputs. If A guesses the random bit correctly,
then S can break the EVoDCBDH problem. Hence, we have
k−ASH
oDCBDH
AdvA
≤ AdvEV
(λ)
S

5

(8)

Extension

We can extend the above k-time ASH protocol in the two party setting to the
multiple party setting using the classic BD broadcasting protocol [10]. The Setup,
KeyGen, Register and Tracing algorithms are same as the two party setting, except
the Handshake algorithm, which will be described below. Note that we suppose
at most n users in the multiple party setting.
0

– Round 1: User i computes Ri = hri = hH2 (ri ||xi ||si ) , ri ∈R Zq and broadcasts (Ri , g ti , hwi , Ci ). Note that xi , si denote the secret key and the secret
credential value of user i, and Ci = ê(hα , g ti )xi . Also notice that the indices
are taken module n so that user 0 is user n and user i+1 is user 1.
– Round 2: After receiving n-1 messages in Round 1, then user i computes
0
wj
sj
cj = g ti ·xi ·hsi ·ej /α , ej = H3 (Rri )}n−1
{C
= hwj ·hα·H1 (h ||Cj ) }n−1
j
j=1,j6=i and {h
j=1,j6=i .
∗
s∗
·s
H4 (h i+1 i )
Eventually, user i computes the intermediate key Ki =
and
∗
∗
H4 (hsi−1 ·si )
cj , ej }n−1 ).
broadcasts (Ki , {C
j=1,j6=i
∗
Note
that si = si · e∗i +
ri0 , e∗i = H3∗(Ri ||H1 (hwi ||Ci )),
∗
wi+1
||Ci+1 ) ei+1
hsi+1 = (hwi+1 · hα·H1 (h
)
· Ri+1 , e∗i+1 = H3 (Ri+1 ||H1 (hwi+1 ||Ci+1 )),
∗
wi−1
e
s∗
||C
)
w
α·H
(h
i−1
) i−1 ·Ri−1 , e∗i−1 = H3 (Ri−1 ||H1 (hwi−1 ||Ci−1 )).
h i−1 = (h i−1 ·h 1

cj }j6=i from n-1
– Key Derivation: User i verifies the received messages {C
users (it supports batch verification, see below), if either of them fail, then
∗
∗
abort; Otherwise, computes the final session key ski = H4 (hsi−1 ·si )n ⊕Kin−1 ⊕
n−2
Ki+1
· · · ⊕ Ki−2 ).
1. Batch Verification. User i is able to batch verify the received n-1 messages
from n-1 users using the small exponents test in [3, 13].
n−1
Y

ê(

δ

cj j , hα ) = ê(
C

j=1

n−1
Y

g ti ·xj ·δj · hsj ·ej ·δj /α , hα )

j=1

=

n−1
Y

ê(g ti ·xj ·δj , hα ) · ê(

j=1
?

=

n−1
Y

n−1
Y

hsj ·ej ·δj , h)

j=1
n−1
Y

δ

Cj j · ê(

j=1

hsj ·δj , hej ).

j=1

r0

Where δj ∈ Zq , ej = H3 (Rj i ) and j ∈ [1, j 6= i, · · · , n − 1]. If batch verification fail, then abort; Otherwise, proceeds.
2. Correctness Check.
∗

∗

n−2
ski = H4 (hsi−1 ·si )n ⊕ Kin−1 ⊕ Ki+1
· · · ⊕ Ki−2
∗

∗

H4 (hsi+1 ·si )n−1
) ⊕
∗
∗
H4 (hsi−1 ·si )n−1

∗
s∗
i−1 ·si n

= H4 (h
⊕

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

H4 (hsi+2 ·si+1 )n−2
H4 (hsi−1 ·si−2 )
·
·
·
⊕
∗
∗
∗
∗
H4 (hsi ·si+1 )n−2
H4 ((hsi−3 ·si−2 )
∗

∗

∗

∗

= H4 (hsi−1 ·si ) ⊕ H4 ((hsi ·si+1 ) · · · ⊕ H4 ((hsi−2 ⊕si−1 ).
It is easy to see that all users compute the same key.
The k-time ASH protocol in the multiple party setting also achieved session key
security, anonymity and public traceability. In particular, the security analysis
(including session key security and anonymity) in the two party setting can be
extended to the multiple party setting.

6

Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed a k-time authenticated secret handshake protocol
based on the k-time tag bases and anonymized Schnorr signature. We also defined the formal security models for session key security and (full) anonymity,
and proved the security of the proposed k-ASK protocol under our proposed
complexity assumptions which have been proved hard in the generic bilinear
group model.
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